REPRO aims to fill gaps in knowledge of factors which drive changes in fertility rates and generate new scientific and policyoriented knowledge on the reproductive decision-making of contemporary Europeans. Understanding obstacles that prevent people from realising their intentions to have a child can bring about valuable policy implications. REPRO partners (RP) studied reproductive decision-making from a macro-, micro-and macro-micro perspective.
certain level of economic development, economic growth is associated with increased fertility rate. A decomposition of GDP into different components shows that fertility rates co-vary with the increase in female employment rates. Most of the effect attributed to an increase captures increasing opportunities for women to combine family life and employment. Further economic development is likely to stimulate an increase of fertility rates.
Family policies
Policies influencing family and reproductive behaviour have a wide variety of objectives. Most were not enacted with an explicit or implicit aim to influence individual reproductive behaviour, and their success or failure should not be judged by their fertility effects. Policies may affect various social groups in different ways with respect to their age, number of children, educational attainment, employment status or partnership status. Findings on the influences of policies at an individual level may not be easily translated into statements about the aggregate impact of policies on fertility rates. Financial support for families has a major impact on the cost of children, but its impact on fertility seems limited. While there is a clear influence on the timing of births, the impact on fertility is often short-lived and the policy influence of completed cohort fertility is often debatable. This debate is further complicated by the fact that it is frequently impossible to disentangle the effects specific policies may have on fertility in the absence of long-term information on policy changes and mutual interactions between policies. There is usually no evidence concerning the 'counterfactual' situation, i.e. what would the observed fertility trend be in the absence of given policy measures. REPRO's contribution to understanding the policy effects on fertility levels is based on international comparisons. The analyses refer to a typology of countries by types of family policies and analyses of the effect of policy packages on fertility.
Typology
European countries were divided in three groups according to welfare regimes: socialist welfare regimes; liberal welfare regimes and traditional welfare regimes. REPRO participants used the OECD Family database to map cross-country differences in family policy models and update the existing classification. A principal component analysis was performed to characterise how the components of family support are combined and how different countries are located with regard to these 'packages'.
The results support the view of persistent differences in family policy patterns embedded in different contexts of work-family outcomes. Previous groupings of policy regimes are only partially corroborated, owing to considerable within-group heterogeneity and the presence of group outliers. Four main groups were identified; The Nordic countries stand out for their comprehensive support to working parents with very young children; Anglo-Saxon countries where support for working parents with very young children is less comprehensive and spending is higher for older children.
In these countries, financial support is more clearly targeted on low-income and/or large families and a mix of countries from eastern and southern Europe plus Japan and Korea, where the degree of support is lower, whichever type is considered. Other European countries form a less homogeneous group with a more intermediate position. REPRO investigated the three salient contextual dimensions related to key objectives of family policies: poverty, fertility and labour market position of families.
Considering country groupings by policy regime is important for other reasons than classifying existing policy sets and analysing their changes over time. Existing policies were not established in a vacuum, but they were shaped by cultural traditions and prevailing societal norms in a given country and in turn shaped these traditions. It is important to consider whether a policy measure lagged behind the broader social change or acted as a forerunner of some behavioural and value changes. Policies that have a certain effect in one welfare context may not operate in the same way in another one.
Policy packages
REPRO reviewed contemporary evidence on the effect of policies in the areas of financial support, parental leave and childcare on fertility patterns. Here we discuss major findings based mostly on literature review. The results are diverse, but some general conclusions can be drawn.
Financial transfers
Much of the effect of financial transfers on fertility concerns the timing of births rather than completed fertility rates. The relatively small effect of cash transfers to families found in a number of studies can be explained by that fact that financial transfers do little to reduce the opportunity costs of childrearing, which have increased with rising female labour market aspirations. They only cover a small part of the direct cost of children and can be one-time contributions that do not substantially reduce costs.
Duration and payment of parental leave
The effect of paid and employment-protected leave on fertility is ambiguous. These entitlements support household income and labour market attachment around childbirth, which will have a positive effect on fertility. However, as entitlements are often conditional on employment, they encourage men and women to postpone childbirth until they have established themselves in the labour market, which has a negative effect on overall fertility. This is likely to explain the variable results reported for the effect of leave entitlements on fertility rates from cross-country comparisons. It is not clear whether the duration of leave entitlements increases or decreases fertility, but its effect is small. Payment conditions during the leave period can affect fertility behaviour. The effect is small and influences the timing of births rather than completed family size.
Some countries allow long periods of home-care leave or childcare leave benefits paid at a flat rate. Payment rates are much lower than earnings-related parental leave payments but, taken together with other financial transfers they can amount to up to one-third of net average income in Finland. These payments can have a positive effect on fertility rates, particularly by promoting second and third children, often among low-income families.
Formal child care
Evidence from cross-country and national studies almost invariably points to a positive and significant effect of formal child care availability on fertility rates. Studies also find that affordable, good-quality childcare can have a substantial effect on fertility rates. Part-time employment and a more equitable sharing of unpaid work between partners can also contribute to higher birth rates.
Family policy packages
In the light of the recent fertility rebound observed in several OECD countries, the impact of different family policy settings on fertility was tested, using data from 18 OECD countries. The robustness of the findings was tested by controlling for birth postponement and for different national contexts. Results confirm that fertility trends depend crucially on opportunities for mothers to combine work and family. Family policy packages appear as important factors to explain why fertility rates are currently and sustainably higher in countries where women have a larger access to the labour market. Different policy instruments are found to have a cumulative influence, suggesting that a continuum of support for working parents during early childhood is likely to facilitate parents' choice to have children. Policy levers do not have similar weight. In-cash benefits covering the years after childbirth and the coverage of childcare services for children under the age of three, have a larger potential influence on fertility than leave entitlements and benefits. 
Fertility intentions
A regression analysis is performed where intentions are a dependent variable which is explained with variables such as age, sex, union status and education. It is assumed that intentions are formed under direct influence of these factors. Influences on having a child can be measured by asking people about their beliefs about the impact of having a child (behavioural), the extent to which others want them to have a child (normative), and the extent to which both internal factors and external factors impede or assist with having and caring for a child (control).
The GGS provided useful data for the application of the TPB which includes questions about beliefs and traditional 'background' factors, and data were available for eight countries: Bulgaria, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Russia. We were able to include responses from 58,014 individuals aged between 18 and 49 in our analyses. The new knowledge achieved form the application of the TPB is presented in three groups: first, related to beliefs about having another child; second, about the impact of the three antecedents on the formation of fertility intentions; and third, about the impact of macro-level factors and relevant policy implications.
Beliefs
Beliefs about positive outcomes were measured with the question: 'Do you expect having a child to be better or worse for joy and satisfaction; care in old age; certainty in life, and closeness with partner?' On average it was found that in all countries having a second child will bring joy and satisfaction. At the lowest level is Germany, while France and Italy were leading the list. Normative beliefs were measured with the question: 'Do your parents, friends and relatives, agree or disagree you should have another child?' The least normative pressure was reported by the German respondents while Italians were the most affected by the opinion of important members of their social network. Beliefs about perceived control were analysed with caution because the GGS measured perceived constraints but not whether the respondents believe they can be overcome.
Attitudes, norms and control
Beliefs about control are divided in two groups: material control and childcare. The findings show that variables that are important to people from different countries do not always influence the intention to have a child. In most countries, the more one expects positive outcomes the more likely it is to have a second child, and expected positive outcomes have the strongest effect on intentions.
Other conclusions -Parity: The decision to become a parent for the first time involves only expected positive outcomes and subjective norms in most countries.
-Age: Under 25s are influenced by possible negative outcomes more than 25 to 34 year olds. Under 25s are concerned about loss of freedom, while 25-34 year olds are concerned about making ends meet and finding childcare.
-Gender: Perceived control has a stronger influence for men in most countries.
-Values and general attitudes affect intentions by influencing social psychological beliefs.
-Social psychological explanation of fertility intentions substantially improves our understanding of how fertility intentions are formed, increasing variance explained from around 10 % for traditional variables to between 35 % and 67 % in different countries for different subgroups of the population based on beliefs that reflect the theory of planned behaviour.
Macro-level differences and policy implications
Grouping by policy context provided a good explanation of the intentions to have a second child of 25 to 34 year old females with one child. This highlighted more differences in influences than grouping by either wealth or employment stability. The differences highlighted by differences in policy context are not those that respond to policy: expectations in higher policy support contexts of satisfaction have a stronger influence on the decision to have another child than they do for women in lower policy support contexts. Social influences are more important and personal control is less important. No significant differences between these contexts were observed in the effect of attitudes to freedom, material control or perceived need for childcare on the decision to have another child, yet these are the factors that reflect policymakers' concerns with work-life balance. It appears that women in countries with stronger policy support think more about social and emotive issues that have the strongest influence on the decision to have another child.
Realisation of intentions
Four data sets could be synchronised for a joint study: Bulgaria, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Data for the United Kingdom and France were analysed in separate. Research on this topic rested on the use of panel data for: Bulgaria, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In the data sets there were questions which measured an intention to have a child within a specified period of time. Data from the subsequent panel could be used to check the fulfilment of this intention. As an outcome, the following categories were identified and analysed: intentional parents (fulfilled their intention and had a child within three years), postponers (did not have the intended child during the three years but declared that they intend to have a child during the subsequent three years) and abandoners (did not have the intended child during the three years and at the second wave declared that they do not intend to have a child during the subsequent three years). This categorisation help understand better the influence of factors that may obstruct the realisation of intentions to have a child. The intentional parents presumably did not confront insurmountable obstacles for the realisation of their childbearing intention. Postponers confronted factors that either had a temporary effect or were evaluated as surmountable within a short time, and abandoners have confronted hard constraints for the fulfilment of their intention at least during the next few years. The categorisation can be an important contribution to the understanding of contemporary fertility postponement. Recuperation of fertility is a trend of relative rise in the fertility rates observed when the rise in the mean ages declines. The term 'postponement' at macro-level needs not correspond to postponement of births by individuals. Macro-level postponement can be the outcome of diverse changes in fertility behaviour.
A rise in the mean ages can appear also because of postponers. REPRO analysed the three categories for the four countries where the survey data were compatible. In these countries, short-term intentions were defined for a period of two years and measured for a period of three years. Wide differences between countries were found for the success or failure to realise childbearing intentions within specific population groups. The pace of social change in the former communist countries could be responsible for the observed weak relationship between intentions and behaviour. Ideas about family formation and social schemes about the timing of parenthood change only gradually. The slowly changing normative system of childbearing has coexisted with rapidly changing societal conditions. This involved many uncertainties and resulted in a high rate of postponement and abandonment of fertility intentions. A complementary interpretation can be based on the concept of 'unrealistic optimism': individuals can be unrealistically optimistic in their intentions if they overestimate the degree of control they have over their fertility behaviour. Further research is needed on this field.
Researchers shed new light on the concept of childbearing postponement. Often there is the indirect assumption that the aggregate postponement occurred because people intended to have a child later in their life. However, another kind of causality is plausible as well: postponement of fertility results from a failure to realise one's childbearing intention. Aggregatelevel postponement is to a large extent the consequence of involuntary postponement. This connection could be an important element of the 'behavioural understanding of the postponement'. The underlying argument for hindering the first or second birth is that certain social and demographic positions can create favourable or unfavourable circumstances for the realisation of childbearing intentions. Among the factors analysed, age, sex, parity, partnership status and education had a strong effect on the realisation of childbearing intentions. Those who failed to realise their intention within three years are older than those who succeeded. This result supports the 'biological clock' argument, namely the importance of an age-related increase in infertility which prevents some couples from achieving a pregnancy and carrying it to term. However, lifestyle factors may play an important role as well: for instance, some men and women may 'accommodate' to their childlessness status to the point of becoming reluctant to realise their earlier intentions. The term 'perpetual postponement' characterises this situation best.
Except in Bulgaria childless people have a higher risk than parents to become postponers rather than realising their 
Economic uncertainty and fertility intentions, timing and level
Economic uncertainty has been identified as one of the main explanations for delayed childbearing in Europe. REPRO partners examined in WP4 the impact of work uncertainty on fertility in France, using a variety of fertility indicators. France has a peculiar position in Europe, having one of the highest fertility levels, combined with generous and diversified system of family policies on one hand and high levels of employment uncertainty on the other hand. Relatively high labour protection for most employees and rather high flexibility in work-family arrangements is combined with high unemployment rate and high frequency of non-standard labour contracts, especially among younger people. Fertility intentions are affected by uncertainty especially among men, for whom being unemployed decreases their fertility plans. Women's fertility intentions are reduced when they have an insecure job. These results suggest that for men it is important to get a job, whatever its quality or stability, before becoming fathers. After controlling for cohort, achieved education, religiosity, age at union formation and the number of siblings, there was no effect of unemployment at the beginning of partnership on the timing of first birth. A spell of unemployment or an insecure job during partnership reduces first birth intensity among men, whereas for women unemployment does not have any significant effect. However, insecure jobs also reduce their first birth propensity. The voluntary childlessness and in approval of having children in a consensual union is strongly related to how far a country is 'advanced' in the second demographic transition (SDT) process. The most advanced countries have much higher approval levels of these behaviours, indicating that the changes in norms occur in tandem with the changes in values and behaviours typical of the SDT. However, other analysed norms remain more or less unaffected by a country's advancement in the SDT.
Third, across Europe, the highly educated, the religiously uncommitted and those who value autonomy are much more likely to approve behaviours that are in line with the SDT than people with the opposite set of characteristics. At the same time, country-level differences in norms related to voluntary childlessness and to having a child outside marriage remain prominent, even if compositional differences in these individual-level characteristics are taken into account.
Explaining cross-national variation in childlessness norms Finally, special attention was given to the norm about voluntary childlessness, which varied strongly between countries. Twolevel models were used to investigate variation in the association between individual and cultural factors with norms on voluntary childlessness in 25 European countries. The role of individual determinants, such as age, gender and education, was analysed alongside the role of macro-level structural and cultural determinants of norms about childlessness, specifically, the availability of child care facilities and the role of religion and gender equality. Especially cultural factors, such as individual religiousness, education and gender equality in a country were important factors associated with approval of childlessness.
Interestingly, most variation in norms on childlessness was explained by country-level factors, especially gender equality.
More tolerant views with respect to voluntary childlessness were found among women, singles, respondents without children, the currently employed and those satisfied with their income level compared to their counterparts: partnered, fathers, currently not employed and less satisfied with income. Consistent with earlier work, religious people were found to endorse more negative norms with respect to childlessness compared to non-believers. The gender difference does not seem surprising considering the persistence of higher opportunity costs for women of becoming a parent. The gender main effect disappeared when adding the interaction with education, pointing to structural constraints for women to enter parenthood, especially for those who have invested in higher education and better career opportunities. Contrary to earlier research, older respondents showed stronger approval of voluntary childlessness, with a highest approval around age 45.
Most important was the explanation power of country-level predictors. Adding these macro factors, i.e. gross domestic product (GDP), gender equality and child care availability, increased the explained variance of the model by 24 per cent. In particular, gender equality was strongly associated with norms about voluntary childlessness. In countries where the level of gender equality is high, it might be commonplace to accept that both men and women make autonomous decisions about how to structure their lives. As a result, the decision not to have children is not met with much disapproval. However, the availability of child care facilities did not associate significantly with norms about childlessness. Among people with children, though, parents in countries where a large child care gap existed were more disapproving of voluntary childlessness than parents in countries where good parental leave and child care arrangements existed. It seems that parents who live in countries where they had to make relatively large sacrifices to care for their children are much more disapproving towards people who make the choice not to have children -and thus not to make these sacrifices themselves.
These findings show that quite strong opinions on the appropriateness of specific aspects of childbearing behaviour 'still' exist in many European societies. This widespread existence of childbearing norms is remarkable, given that theories of modernisation-such as the second demographic transition-expect an increase in the importance attached to individual autonomy and thus a weakening of normative constraints on demographic behaviour. These norms may be less binding than in the past, but still have an important orienting function. The study also conveys clear evidence that a double standard continues to exist with regard to the combination of parenting young children and full-time employment. For fathers, full-time employment is widely accepted, presumably because they are not expected to spend much time on parenting activities anyway. For mothers, strong resistance to this combination is still pervasive in many European countries. A likely reason is that parenting is still considered mainly to be the task of the mother and that the parenting role may be thought to come under pressure if much time of the mother is consumed by work-related activities.
Child-number and child-timing intentions
Results shed light on the causal process underlying fertility behaviour of individuals in a social context and on selected aggregate-level factors influencing fertility decision-making of Europeans. The analysis used Eurobarometer survey data collected in the 27 EU countries as well as Croatia and Turkey. Analysis was restricted to women and men in the prime reproductive ages, including 5291 respondents aged 20 to 39 years. The research was based on two questions on fertility intentions:
-'How many children do you (still) intend to have?' Respondents were given a choice between seven answers ranging from 'no children' to 'six or more children'.
-The second one was asked only respondents who intended to have (at least) one additional child: 'Do you intend to have a(nother) child in the next three years?' Respondents were given a choice between four answers: 'definitely not,' 'probably not,' 'probably yes,' and 'definitely yes'.
The first measure can be labelled as a child-number intention and the second one is referred to as a child-timing intention.
Both measures were treated as ordinal variables in the proportional odds models with random intercept, which was run separately for respondents without children and respondents with one child. The choice of a stratified analysis by parity was motivated by the finding that childbearing preferences are determined by the actual number of children, corresponding to a sequential nature of fertility decision-making process. Due to the limited sample size, this study could not include an additional set of models for individuals with two or more children. The multilevel framework enabled study the hierarchical structure of the data with 5291 individuals nested in 99 regions, which were clustered in 31 countries. The variance of the dependent variable was explained with individual-level variables, regional-and country-level variables. The following set of individual-level variables was included in the models: age, sex, school enrolment, level of education, marital status, employment status, household situation, church attendance and gender attitudes towards childrearing.
Two regional-level explanatory variables represented the 'fertility context' in which individuals aged 20-40 were socialised.
The analogous variables at the country-level were the completed fertility rate and the mean age at first birth among women born in 1960. The GDP in purchasing power standards (PPS) was included as a country-level economic contextual variable.
According to estimates, short-term fertility intentions are more closely related to situational factors. The total intended family size is closely linked to more enduring individual characteristics. There are some common predictors of both child-number and child-timing intentions. The ability to foresee what one's household situation will be like in the next one or two years increases the number of intended children. This can be interpreted as a signal that increased perceived behavioural control has a positive impact on fertility intentions. Contextual social and economic factors significantly explained the residual variance. The mean actual number of children of the 'parental generation' was positively correlated with the intended number of children among the 'children generation' at the regional level. The GDP per capita was negatively associated with the first child intentions and positively associated with the second child intentions.
Educational differences
Little is known whether increased educational attainment leads to a lower average level of completed fertility. It was found that the ultimate number of children that women have across Europe is negatively related to their level of educational attainment. The higher educated are expected to value autonomy and independence more than the lower educated. The higher educated are expected to spend more time with their children, leading them to prefer a smaller number of children. The higher educated have a stronger preference to pursue a career, this will lead them to decide for a smaller number of children.
It was found that the negative educational gradient is stronger for women than for men. These processes lead to expect a weaker negative gradient for men. The negative educational gradient was weakest in countries classified as 'social-
